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AN OVERVIEW OF
RELIGIOUS
CONSIDERATIONS IN
CHILD CUSTODY
DISPUTES
J. MICHAEL FITZGERALD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The paramount consideration in custody disputes is the welfare of
the child, i.e., what is in his or her best interest.' In making this decision,
courts consider various factors. Most courts, however, are reluctant to use
religion as an element, arguing that such a consideration violates the first
amendment of the United States Constitution. Some courts, however, em-
phasize the spiritual well-being of the child, and hold that the religious
beliefs or practices of the parents and the child are important to the
child's welfare. 2 These contradictory considerations have placed courts in
a seemingly insoluble dilemma: having to choose between competing reli-
gions or ignoring a contributing factor to the child's welfare.
This Article addresses the standards used by the courts to determine
custody. It then describes the varying and often contradictory uses of reli-
gion as a factor in custody disputes and highlights the standards ad-
vanced by courts and commentators in this area. It then addresses the
issue of decisionmaking when parents disagree about the child's religious
upbringing. The Article specifically highlights the dilemma faced by com-
B.S. 1965, Mt. St. Mary's College; J.D. 1970, Catholic University of America; LL.M. 1973,
University of Miami; J.C.L. 1985, St. Thomas Aquinas University, Rome, Italy; M.A. 1988,
St. Thomas University. The author is a founding partner in the law firm of Fitzgerald,
Portela & Portuondo, Miami, Florida.
See Baine v. Baine, 510 So. 2d 262, 263 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So.
2d 778, 782 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 804 (1971); In re Marriage of Sparks, 323
N.W.2d 264, 266 (Iowa 1982).
' See, e.g., Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 484, 232 S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (1977); Randolph v.
Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 495, 1 So. 2d 480, 482 (1941).
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peting parents trying to raise their children according to different reli-
gious tenets, and explains the often contradictory and controversial solu-
tions advanced by the courts.
II. FACTORS USED IN CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
The salient consideration in custody disputes is "the 'best interest' of
the child."' In making this determination, courts must weigh numerous
factors. These include the preference of the child; the child's interaction
with siblings; the mental, physical, and moral well-being of the competing
parents; and the child's adjustment to home, school, and community.4
This list of factors, however, is not exhaustive, and the court must bal-
ance numerous other elements and values before reaching the ultimate
decision: what custody determination best promotes the child's welfare.
In making such a determination, some courts have weighed the moral
fitness of each spouse, and have inquired into the lifestyle of the parents.
For example, some courts have emphasized a parent's adulterous behav-
ior in awarding custody.5 Other courts have held that a parent's homosex-
uality is a relevant consideration, and have noted that homosexual or
adulterous behavior may cause the child to endure the disapproval of so-
ciety.6 Moreover, some courts have deemed such behavior to be evidence
of a parent's deceitfulness, dishonesty, and general moral unfitness.7
Most courts, however, have held that evidence of a parent's adulter-
ous or homosexual behavior can only be considered when there is a show-
ing that such conduct will adversely affect the child.8 Consequently, some
courts have awarded custody to an adulterous parent,9 and others have
held that a spouse's homosexuality, absent a showing of actual harm to
the child, is not a relevant or conclusive factor. 10
3 Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Reli-
gion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702, 1704 (1984). This standard is
applied throughout the United States. See id.
' See Viltz v. Viltz, 384 So. 2d 1348, 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Critchlow v. Critchlow,
347 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
' See, e.g., Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
' See Hall v. Hall, 95 Mich. App. 614, 615, 291 N.W.2d 143, 144 (1980); Jacobson v. Jacob-
son, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that forcing the children to live in the same
house with the mother and her lover, a person of the same sex, "may well cause the children
to 'suffer from the slings and arrows of a disapproving society' to a much greater extent than
would an arrangement wherein the children were placed in the custody of their father with
visitation rights in the mother." Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 81.
0 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 291-93 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981).
9 See, e.g., Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833, 835 (W. Va. 1987).
10 D.H., 418 N.E.2d at 291-93. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals of Indiana,
First District, held that "homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any adverse ef-
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In making a custody determination, the child's preference is some-
times considered.11 However, that preference is neither a controlling nor a
determinative factor since the court may determine that the child's pref-
erence contradicts the court's conclusions concerning the minor's welfare.
Nonetheless, a few courts place strong emphasis on the child's preference.
In fact, some state statutes dictate that a mature child's preference
should be controlling absent specific findings about the preferred parent's
unfitness.1 2
Courts also often invoke the tender age doctrine in awarding cus-
tody." The tender age doctrine states that children of tender years, usu-
ally defined as children below the age of three, should be awarded to the
mother. Invoking this principle, courts are generally guided by the belief
that maternal care is of utmost necessity during an infant's life. However,
many courts and commentators feel that the use of this doctrine discrimi-
nates against fathers. As such, the tender age doctrine, although still rele-
vant in some states, is no longer widely used as a determining factor in
custody disputes.
Courts generally invoke the foregoing factors, as well as numerous
other elements, when attempting to answer the overriding question: how
to promote the best interest of the child. This overriding concern with the
child's welfare, however, often forces a court to focus on a different factor,
one replete with constitutional, psychological, and moral implications: re-
ligion. This concern with religion, not surprisingly, has given rise to con-
tradictory and varying judicial holdings. Moreover, it has spawned con-
troversy and concern, forcing courts and commentators to balance
competing and seemingly irreconcilable interests.
III. RELIGION AS A FACTOR
A. General Rule
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" Most courts have traditionally
held that these religious clauses forbid courts from deciding among com-
peting religions, and have "consistently refuse[d] to choose between par-
fect upon the welfare of the child does not render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter
of law to have custody of the child." Id. at 293.
" See Annotation, Child's Wishes as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R.3d 1396, 1399
(1965). -
" See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 975 (1983).
13 Id. § 976; see J.B. v. A.B., 161 W. Va. 332, 339-40, 242 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1978).
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ents of different faiths on the basis of religion. 15
In deciding child custody matters when religion becomes an issue,
most courts have adopted an overriding principle: a court will not pass on
the comparative merits of different religions. As the Idaho Supreme
Court explained:
"[T]he rule appears to be well established that the court should maintain
an attitude of strict impartiality between religions and should not disqual-
ify any applicant for custody or restrain any person having custody or visi-
tation rights from taking the children to a particular church, except where
there is a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs
affect the general welfare of the child."16
Accordingly, courts strive to avoid the religion issue, and try to choose the
proper custodial parent based on nonsectarian considerations. Those ef-
forts, however, are often futile, since religion sometimes plays a para-
mount role in determining the child's well-being. Therefore, religious con-
siderations often must be balanced, even as courts strive scrupulously to
stay within the parameters set by the first amendment.
B. Religion
Given the importance of religion as a factor in a child's life, courts
sometimes weigh religious considerations when determining custody.
Cases that consider religion as an element are generally divided into two
categories: the first concerns the child's prior religious upbringing, and
the second concerns when a parent's religious practices are deemed detri-
mental to the child's well-being. As noted by a New York court:
[C]ourts will consider religion in a custody dispute when a child has devel-
oped actual religious ties to a specific religion and those needs can be served
better by one parent than the other; when a religious belief violates a State
statute; and when a religious belief poses a threat to a child's well-being.17
1. Prior Religious Upbringing
The prior religious upbringing of the child, although not conclusive,
is often a relevant factor in custody determinations. In Spencer v. Spen-
cer,"s for example, the children, who had always resided with their
mother, attended a Protestant church, and were raised according to that
faith. After the dissolution of their parents' marriage, the court awarded
" Note, supra note 3, at 1703.
"6 Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 192, 560 P.2d 861, 863 (1977) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 813, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971)).
" Aldous v. Aldous, 99 App. Div. 2d 197, 199, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (3d Dep't 1984).
Is 132 Ill. App. 2d 740, 270 N.E.2d 72 (1971).
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custody to the father. The father's new wife was a practicing Catholic and
was raising her own children as Catholics. After considering these factors,
the appellate court reversed the custody determination, noting that cus-
tody by the father would result in instability given the conflicting reli-
gious beliefs."
The importance given to the child's religious upbringing is greater
when the child has already received formal religious instruction. For ex-
ample, in Shepley v. Szobocsan,20 the father was awarded custody of his
two children after the divorce proceedings. The children attended paro-
chial school and received regular religious instruction. The mother, who
attended a Protestant church regularly, petitioned to obtain custody. She
stated that if she was awarded custody, the children would receive a Prot-
estant upbringing. The court denied her petition, stating that the boys
should be permitted to continue the religious instruction in which they
had become oriented, and the religion into which both parents had for-
mally committed them prior to birth."'
The use of religion as a factor, when the child has been reared in a
specific faith, is seldom controversial. Courts not only weigh this as one
factor among many elements to be considered, but also couch their con-
siderations in less controversial language. In fact, courts do not emphasize
the competition between different religions, but rather, note their concern
for stability and consistency in the child's life. However, the use of reli-
gion as a relevant factor when the parents' religious beliefs and practices
are scrutinized directly is more controversial.
2. Parents' Religious Background
Trial courts, although hesitant to choose among competing religions,
often consider the parents' religious beliefs and practices in their custody
decisions. This inquiry is sometimes limited to determining whether a
particular practice violates a statute or public policy. Sometimes, how-
ever, the inquiry is more open-ended, seeking to determine whether par-
ticular practices or beliefs violate the child's well-being. Such considera-
tions inevitably force courts to draw implied, or even explicit conclusions
about specific sectarian beliefs, and sometimes imply controversial value
judgments. Not surprisingly, such inquiries have drawn the ire and criti-
cism of numerous commentators.
Courts will not hesitate to use religion as a factor where a parent's
religious practices violate public policy. As noted by one commentator,
"[t]he Supreme Court has declared that the state has a 'compelling' inter-
' Id. at 743, 270 N.E.2d at 74.
20 84 Dauph 7 (Pa. 1965).
21 Id.
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est in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a mi-
nor.' "22 As such, the first amendment to the United States Constitution
does not bar a court from considering religion "when one parent's reli-
gious practices threaten the child's temporal health or physical safety.""3
Courts, however, do not limit their inquiry to those instances when
religious practices violate public policy. Some courts, although hesitant to
choose among different religions, openly prefer religious to nonreligious
parents.24 In Murray v. Murray,2 5 for example, the father stated that he
would provide religious training for the child. The child was living with
the mother, who was living with and was pregnant by a man who was not
her husband. The court awarded custody to the father, holding that the
child's best interests were protected by such a decision. 2' The court spe-
cifically stated that the mother demonstrated a disregard for moral
principles.
Some courts' preference for religious over nonreligious parents is evi-
dent in spite of assertions by the courts that they are adhering to consti-
tutional principles. In Schreifels v. Schreifels,27 the Washington Supreme
Court insisted that it would not prefer one religion over another. None-
theless, the court awarded custody to the father and emphasized that one
of the deciding factors was that the mother was not giving the children
proper religious training.28 The court specifically noted that the father
was a devout Catholic, while the mother engaged in adulterous behavior.2"
The preference of religious over nonreligious parents has come under
intense criticism, as commentators note that such preference violates the
constitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion. Critics
specifically contend that preferring religious parents has the primary ef-
fect of advancing religion.3 0 As a result, the consideration of religion as a
factor has evolved along generally accepted parameters: religion will not
be considered a factor unless such an omission will have a negative im-
pact on the child's well-being. As the Alabama Supreme Court explained:
When presented with a situation where the involvement of the parents in
religious activities could have a direct and adverse effect upon the children,
22 Note, supra note 3, at 1705 n.15 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57
(1982)).
13 Id. at 1705.
", See Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 799, 451 A.2d 374, 378 (1982).
" 220 So. 2d 790 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 La. 290, 223 So. 2d 411 (1969).
" Id. at 794.
47 Wash. 2d 409, 287 P.2d 1001 (1955).
Id. at 416, 287 P.2d at 1004.
09 Id.
so For a detailed examination of the issues raised by the use of religion in custody disputes
and its implications, see Mangum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitu-
tional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1981).
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the trial judge is free to examine the extent of that involvement and, if he
determines that such involvement will threaten the welfare of the child,
then the court may award custody to whomever it deems to be the most
appropriate custodian."
However, limiting the inquiry to the child's welfare, without violating the
first amendment's religion clauses, has often proved elusive. This has
been specifically evident where both parents, even after a custody deter-
mination, seek to influence the child's religious upbringing.
IV. DECISIONS CONCERNING RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING
A final custody determination does not end the controversy sur-
rounding religion and custody disputes. In fact, such a determination
often leads to a new, more perplexing issue: what happens when the com-
peting parents disagree about the child's religious upbringing? Such a di-
lemma implicates the traditional province of the custodial parent and the
emerging trend toward shared decisionmaking. It implicates, moreover,
the constitutional rights of the noncustodial parent who, through his or
her visitation rights, may seek to influence the child's religious upbring-
ing. It implicates, finally, the polestar of all custody-related decisions: the
best interest of the child.
A. Traditional View
Courts have traditionally allowed the custodial parent sole responsi-
bility over the child's religious upbringing. Generally, "the party to whom
custody of children is granted in a divorce decree has the prerogative of
selecting the religious, cultural, and educational institutions which the
child should attend." 2 This rule, although often criticized, is still fol-
lowed overwhelmingly throughout the United States.
The general rule usually applies to all aspects of a child's religious
upbringing. In Spring v. Glawon,83 a New York appellate court noted
that:
As a matter of policy, the initial posture of the courts with respect to the
religious upbringing of a child should be one of noninterference. The deter-
mination of that matter is best left to the child, if of sufficient age and
intelligence, agreement of the parents or, where there is no agreement, to
the custodial parent.-
Hilley v. Hilley, 405 So. 2d 708, 711 (Ala. 1981).
Connelly v. Connelly, 409 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Montandon v.
Montandon, 242 Cal. App. 2d 886, 52 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1966)).
U 89 App. Div. 2d 980, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1982).
Id. at 981, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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As such, the courts have developed a reliable test to decide the question
of the proper decisionmaker: when the parents cannot agree, the custodial
parent determines the child's religious upbringing. This seemingly simple
solution, however, has raised numerous concerns. Specifically, courts and
commentators have begun to wonder whether the traditional view under-
mines the noncustodial parent's constitutional rights.
B. Rights of Noncustodial Parent
While questioning the traditional decisionmaking model, which al-
lows the custodial parent to make final decisions concerning the child's
religious upbringing, critics have specifically emphasized the first amend-
ment rights of the visiting parent, who is often denied a chance to influ-
ence the child's religious upbringing. Commentators have increasingly
emphasized the noncustodial parent's privacy rights and have argued that
the definition of these rights may be broad enough to encompass the vis-
iting parent's right to influence the child's upbringing. These concerns,
consequently, have forced courts and legislators to seek novel ways of ad-
dressing the decisionmaking issue.
The first amendment's religion clauses not only bar courts from
choosing between competing religions, but also guarantee both parents'
religious freedom."5 As a practical matter, the visiting parent may not be
able to take the child to church, teach him or her specific religious tenets,
or share aspects of his or her religious practice. Such conditions, which
flow from the practical implications of the traditional rule, have led some
critics to argue that allowing the custodial parent to make the major deci-
sions about the child's life violates the noncustodial parent's religious
freedom. 6
A second concern, although not as widespread, is the parent's right to
privacy. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution embraces an
implied right to privacy.37 The Court has expanded that right to include
such traditional family concerns as choices regarding contraceptives and a
woman's decision to have an abortion. 8 Consequently, some commenta-
" The first amendment's religion clauses are often at odds with each other. Consequently,
they often lead to varying and contradictory results, leading many commentators to suggest
innovative ways of addressing freedom of religion and establishment clause issues. For an
examination of these issues, see F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION (1976).
" See Skoloff, Divorce Poses Peculiar Problems for a Child's Religious Learning, Nat'l L.J.,
Dec. 1, 1986, at 23.
" See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
M See id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that right of privacy was
broad enough to encompass woman's right to abortion). Although the decisions and their
progeny have been thoroughly criticized, they remain the prime examples of the Supreme
Court's extension of the right to privacy.
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tors have opined that this right may encompass the noncustodial parent's
right to influence the child's upbringing, including decisions concerning
religious and educational considerations.
These considerations have led some courts to expand the role played
by the noncustodial parent. As noted by a commentator: "Recently, many
courts, in an effort to simplify the problem, have decided that a non-
custodial parent may attempt to impart his or her religious beliefs on the
children, or abstain from enforcing the custodial parent's beliefs as long
as no harm is threatened to the children."39 The requisite showing of
harm, however, is difficult to define.40 Expanding the role of the noncus-
todial parent may, moreover, raise practical problems, including how to
decide between conflicts emanating from competing attempts to influence
the, child. As such, many courts have been forced to continue with the
traditional rule: the custodial parent decides any questions concerning
the child's religious upbringing.
C. Shared Parental Responsibility
In an attempt to meet the practical effects of the traditional rule,
preserve the requisite constitutional guarantees, and promote stability in
the child's life, many states have adopted shared parental responsibility
acts. These statutes generally seek to ensure that the child will enjoy fre-
quent and continuing visits with both parents, and seek to encourage
both parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing. As
such, these statutes usually require that both parents "confer so that ma-
jor decisions affecting the welfare of the child will be determined
jointly.' 1 1
In enacting these statutes, legislatures sought to mandate that courts
"require shared parental responsibility in all cases unless it would be det-
rimental to the child."'42 In doing so, they sought to ensure that all major
decisions in the child's life, such as educational and religious training,
would be undertaken together. However, these acts, while setting a desir-
able standard, have not ended the controversies surrounding decisions
about the child's life. In fact, parents' frequent inability to reach an ac-
cord not only frustrates the intent of shared parental responsibility stat-
utes, but also fails to answer the fundamental issue: who decides when
parents cannot agree about the child's religious upbringing? Accordingly,
courts are again forced to rely on the traditional rule, and allow the custo-
39 Skoloff, supra note 36, at 23.
40 See id.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988). Florida's Shared Parental Responsi-
bility Act is similar to many statutes enacted throughout the United States.
,' Vazquez v. Vazquez, 443 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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dial parent sole responsibility.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to use religion as an element
in custody determinations, and, therefore, usually decide custody disputes
based on other factors. Sometimes, however, courts are forced to take re-
ligious factors into consideration, especially when a parent's religious
practices violate public policy or threaten to harm the child. Some courts
also openly prefer religious over nonreligious parents. In fact, many
courts have made references to the moral and religious stature of the
competing parents, thereby elucidating the role that religious and moral
considerations play in custody determinations.
After a custody determination is made, courts traditionally allow the
custodial parent to make all decisions concerning the child's religious up-
bringing. This traditional view, however, is being eroded. Critics are espe-
cially concerned about the visiting parent's constitutional rights. Conse-
quently, legislators have adopted shared parental responsibility statutes,
seeking to have both parents share the decisionmaking role. In spite of
these developments, most courts still allow the custodial parent to make
all decisions concerning the child's religious upbringing, a fact that high-
lights the importance of the initial custody decision, and emphasizes the
place given religion as a factor in reaching such a decision.
